DEADLIEST ACCIDENT IN AVIATION HISTORY

                            Credits: Smithsonian channel

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Exactly 41 years ago, at Tenerife-North airport, On March 27,1977 the aviation family faced a terrible disaster, two giant Boeing 747 passenger jets, KLM FLIGHT 4805 and PAN AM FLIGHT 1736 collided on the runway at Los Rodeos airport which is know well known as Tenerife North airport on the Spanish Island of Tenerife, Canary islands, the disaster killed 583 people, making it the deadliest accident in aviation history.

MAIN DETAILS OF KLM BOEING 747-206B

TYPE: Boeing 747-206B

NAME: Rijn ("Rhine")

OPERATOR: KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

REGISTRATION: PH-BUF

FLIGHT ORIGIN: Schipol Airport Amsterdam, Netherlands

DESTINATION: Gran Canaria Airport, Canary Islands

PASSENGERS: 234

CREW:14

FATALITIES: 248

SURVIVORS: None

CREW: Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen Van Zanten aged 50.

              First officer Klaas Merus aged 42.

              Flight engineer Willem Schreuder aged 48.

              14 cabin crew.

Captain Jacob was KLM's chief pilot with 11,700 flight hours of which 1545 hours were on the 747, Merus had 9200 flight hours where by 95 hours were on the 747, and lastly Schreuder has 15210 flight hours where by 540 hours were on the 747.

MAIN DETAILS OF PAN AM BOEING 747-121

TYPE: Boeing 747-121

NAME: Clipper Victor

OPERATOR: Pan American World Airways

REGISTRATION: N736PA

FLIGHT ORIGIN: International airport of Los Angeles, USA

STOPOVER: John F Kennedy International airport, New York City, USA

DESTINATION: Gran Canaria Airport, Canary Islands

PASSENGERS: 380

CREW: 16

FATALITIES: 335

INJURIES: 61

SURVIVORS:61

CREW: Captain Victor Grubbs aged 56.

              First officer Robert Bragg aged 39.

              Flight Engineer George Warns aged 46.

              13 cabin crew.

Captain Victor had 21043 flight hours of which 564 hours were on the 747, Bragg had 10800 flight hours where by 2796 hours were on the 747 and Warns had 15210 flight hours where by 559 hours were on the 747.

WEATHER CONDITIONS AT LOS RODEOS AIRPORT.

Weather conditions at Los Rodeos airport were not so good, visibility was not good because Los Rodeos airport is at 633 meters (2077 feet) above sea level, which gives rise to cloud behavior that differs from that at many other airports. Clouds at 600m (2000ft) above ground level at Los Rodeos. Drifting clouds of different densities cause wildly varying visibility, from unhindered at one moment to below the minimums the next.

A terrorist attack at Gran Canaria airport had caused flight diversions to Los Rodeos, including the two aircraft involved in the accident. The airport got very congested because with a bulk of planes both cargo and passenger planes which also blocked the taxiway and that forced the taking off aircraft to taxi on the runway instead, plus thick fog was prevailing across the airfield where the aircraft and the control tower could not see each other.

WHY DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT TO LOS RODEOS??

       Both flights were given their own flight plans which were well routine until they approached the islands. At exactly 1315 a bomb exploded in the terminal of Gran Canaria international airport which was planted by the separatist Canary islands movement, injuring eight people. There had been a phone call warning of he bomb, and soon after another phone call warning  claimed that a second bomb was at the airport. The authorities  had to close the airport for safety and also diverted all its incoming flights o Los Rodeos , that also included the two Boeing 747.

All traffic from Gran Canaria including five large airliners, had been told to divert to Los Rodeos , a regional airport which is too small to accommodate many planes, the tiny little airport only had one runway and on major taxiway parallel to it, with four taxiways connecting the two. While waiting for Gran Canaria international airport to reopen, the diverted aircraft took so much way that they occupied the taxiway, which clearly means that it can not be used for taxiing anymore, Instead, departing aircraft had to taxi along the runway position themselves to take off,which is a procedure known as back taxiing or back track.

IMPORTANT COCKPIT AND ATC TOWER COMMUNICATIONS

The communications are taken from the cockpit voice recorders of both aircraft, as well as from the Tenerife control tower's tapes.

1705:36:7

(KLM first officer completes pre-flight checklist. KLM 4805 is now at the end of the runway,in position for departure)

1705:41.5

KLM first officer, "wait a miunte, we don't have an ATC clearance. (This statement apparently a response to an advancing of the throttles in the KLM) 

KLM captain "NO, i know that, go ahead and ask.

1705:44.6-1705:50.8

KLM (RADIO): The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance.

1705:53.4-1706:08.1

TENERIFE TOWER KLM: eight seven zero five you are cleared to the papa beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR.

1706;07.4

KLM CAPTAIN: yes

1706:09.6-1706:17.8

KLM (RADIO): Ah Roger sir, we are cleared to the papa beacon flight level nine zero, right turn out zero four zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now at take off (or "Uh takimg off")

1706:11.1

(KLM brakes released)

1706:12.3

KLM CAPTAIN: We gaaannnn.....check thrust 

1706:14.0

(Engine acceleration audible in KLM cockpit)

1706:18.2-1706:21.2

TENERIFE TOWER :OK....standby for take off, i will call you, (Only the start of this message could be heard clearly by the KLM crew due to a radio heterodoxy)

1706:19.3

PAN AM CAPTAIN: No.....Uh

1706:20.3

PAN AM (RADIO): And we're still taxing down the runway, the clipper one seven three six. (this message was not heard completely clear by the KLM crew due to a radio heterodoxy)

1706:29.5

PAN AM (RADIO): OK, will report when we are clear.

1706:31.7

TENERIFE TOWER: Thank you, (that being the last conversation between them)

1706:32-1706:40

1706:32.1

PAN AM CAPTAIN: Let's get the hell out of here.

1706:34.9

PAN AM FIRST OFFICER: yeah, he's anxious, isn't he?

1706:36.2

PAN AM FLT ENGR Yeah, after he held us up for half an hour, that [expletive]. Now he's in a rush.

1706:32.4

KLM FLT ENGR Is hij er niet af dan? [Is he not clear then?]

1706:34.1

KLM CAPTAIN Wat zeg je? [What do you say?]

1706:34.2

KLM UNKNOWN Yup.

1706:34.7

KLM FLT ENGR Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? [Is he not clear, that Pan American?]

1706:35.7

KLM CAPTAIN Jawel. [Oh yes. – emphatic]

1706:40–1706:50

1706:40.5

 [Pan Am captain sees the KLM's landing lights at approx. 700 m]

1706:40.6
PAN AM CAPTAIN There he is ... look at him. Goddamn that son-of-a-bitch is coming!

1706:45.9
PAN AM FIRST OFFICER Get off! Get off! Get off!


1706:43.5
KLM FIRST OFFICER V-1.

1706:44.0
[PH-BUF (KLM 4805) starts rotation]


1706:47.4
KLM CAPTAIN Oh shit!


1706:50
N736PA (Pan Am 1736) records sound of collision.




PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE CRASH
The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Captain Veldhuyzen Van Zanten attempted to take off without clearance. The investigators said that the reason for this was to leave as soon as possible in order to comply with KLM's duty time regulations and also before the  weather deteriorates more.


WHAT DO STUDENT PILOTS LEARN FROM THIS?
We as student pilots in order to avoid such problems should very clearly listen to the tower and follow whatever they say as they know and understand what decision is best for the airport/aerodrome, in case anything is not understood through the radio, you can always say ,"say again" to them.

 WHAT ELSE DO YOU THINK STUDENT PILOTS SHOULD DO/ FOLLOW FOR IMPROVING THEIR FLYING SKILLS???

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QUOTE OF THE DAY:
" TRULY SUPERIOR PILOTS ARE THOSE WHO USE THEIR SUPERIOR JUDGEMENT TO AVOID THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE THEY MIGHT HAVE TO USE THEIR SUPERIOR SKILLS" 
 By: Frank Borman, Commander of Apollo 8